The historical and cultural rationale for China's common prosperity
How do East and West differ in their understandings of common prosperity?
Xin Ming
In Chinese society, shared prosperity has long held a significant place in traditional Chinese social ideals. Like Confucius said, "The ruler of a state or the head of a family is concerned not about scarcity but about the unfair distribution of wealth, not about poverty but about social instability."
All human cultures have a shared desire to live in an ideal society in which prosperity is probably the most sought-after characteristic. However, different civilizations and communities have fundamentally different views on what constitutes prosperity and what form it should take.
How do East and West differ in their understandings of common prosperity, and what underlying factors contribute most significantly to such differences?
Differences between East and West in defining common prosperity
Historically, Western culture has often regarded prosperity as applicable to society as a whole, while maintaining that prosperity for all individuals is totally unrealistic. Although Plato envisioned an ideal state with shared property and a communal lifestyle, he recognized that this was purely a thought experiment, and could never exist in real life. Meanwhile, Aristotle thought his own proposal for an ideal city-state was realistic and was "the best form of government" because he thought it successfully balanced the interests of the rich and poor rather than eliminating wealth disparity.
Utopia, authored by Englishman Thomas More in the 16th century, and City of the Sun, by Italian Tommaso Campanella in the 17th century, while rich in detail and passionate in their calls for ending the rich-poor divide, were nevertheless both considered "descriptions of imaginary ideal societies (so-called Utopias)." Even the word Utopia itself, from the Greek for "nowhere," reveals its cultural and historical understanding at the subconscious level.
As capitalism has become entrenched as a modern Western social value, the very idea of common prosperity is considered impossible, unthinkable even.
In Chinese society, in contrast, shared prosperity has long held a significant place in traditional Chinese social ideals, exemplified by Xiaokang (moderate prosperity) and Datong (great harmony). Datong as a value is superior to Xiaokang: "When the Great Way prevails, it brings good to everyone." "For everyone" is a shared value in Chinese culture.
If we fulfill our obligations to the public, then prosperity is the natural and perhaps even foreseeable outcome. Alternatively, to put it another way, affluence without sharing is unjust. Hence, Confucius warned, "The ruler of a state or the head of a family is concerned not about scarcity but about the unfair distribution of wealth, not about poverty but about social instability." This philosophy is deeply ingrained in traditional Chinese society.
Underlying the stark differences between East and West in their understanding of common prosperity are tremendous differences in their historical and cultural perspectives.
Families and the state are the foundations of wellbeing
What is man's place in society? In the West, individuals are regarded as atomistic, emphasizing the attributes of natural persons. This view is based on the historical and cultural background, as well as on religious concepts.
Chinese society is different. In Chinese society, a person is not an isolated individual but one party in a web of social relations and a member of a community, without which he has no existence, significance, or value.
Communities are not external but integral to humans from birth. Communities range from the family as the smallest unit outward to the nation on a broader scale and then extend to the whole world. One's relationships within communities are decisive for one's survival and development.
Chinese thinker Liang Shuming coined the term ethical primacy to describe the emphasis on communal relationships in traditional Chinese society. "Ethical principles begin within the family but don't stop there." Ethical relationships extend to fraternity and the obligations arising from it. Filial piety in the family extends to loyalty to the state.
The conscious realization and manifestation of individual agency is a hallmark of social progress. However, individual agency does not mean the atomization of individuals. Differences in historical and cultural conditions, as well as socioeconomic circumstances, have resulted in fundamental differences between the ethical relationships in traditional Chinese society and the lord-vassal relationships of Western feudal societies. For Chinese people, compliance with human ethics is a conscious assumption of one's responsibility—to other individuals, to the community, and even to nature.
In contrast to this sense of responsibility, the capitalist mode of production—with the Protestant work ethic at its spiritual core—instead of truly liberating workers, it creates a system where wage-earners can freely sell their labor. These wage-slaves are transformed into "the living person [who] is dependent and has no individuality," (Manifesto of the Communist Party) or mere appendages of capital.
Joining or creating a community is an objective need for the socialization of human beings and an eternal pursuit in the civilized development of human society. Communities are intrinsic to human life. As Marx said, the essence of man is the true community of man. This community is life itself, physical and cultural life, human morality, human activity, human enjoyment, and real human existence. If this essence is denied, the more unbearable, the more terrifying, the more contradictory it becomes. (The German Ideology) While Chinese society constructs communities based on the family, the nation, and the world, the hallmarks of traditional social forms, it strongly emphasizes the essence of humanity. This conforms to the laws of historical development and is also consistent with Marxism.
Structural parallels between family and state
Western society, especially in modern times, has resorted to constructing the nation-state on the foundation of individuals, simply because "none of us is self-sufficient, and we all need many things." Or, to escape the insecurity of nature, people establish states by signing contracts to "surrender the right to govern themselves." As Locke claimed, "The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property." Such a form of state is independent and detached from actual individual and common interests, which is why Marx termed it an illusory community.
In traditional Chinese culture, there is a structural parallel between family and state. "Humanity is built on the nation; the nation is built on the family; the family is built on its members" (Mencius (孟子))."When personalities are cultivated, families are regulated; when families are regulated, the country is well governed." There is an inherent continuity in the intrinsic logic between individuals, their families, and the state.
Kinship is the fundamental logic of the family. Bound by ties of blood, the bonds between family members are stronger than any other tie. A family relies on kinship for it to be maintained and to function well. Kinship is also the fundamental logic of countries founded on families. Ren is one of the most central concepts in traditional Chinese culture. Shuowen Jiezi (An Explication of Written Characters) defines Ren as kinship. During the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BC), Confucius' understanding of Ren transcended blood relations, extending to more general connections between people, signifying benevolence, which, when applied as a principle for governance, becomes the benevolent government.
Property relations founded on kinship bonds do not preclude legal relations, but the law is not the primary factor here. Liang Shuming divided property relations within traditional Chinese families into three forms: "common property," "divided property," and "shared property." Property that has not been divided within a family is considered "common property." As brothers grow up and establish their own families, the property is divided among them. However, with divided property, the wealthier members would still share what they have with the poorer ones, and this is true even among relatives, friends, and neighbors. Such family property relations still exist in modern Chinese society.
In the early 1980s, China's new policy to "let some people get rich first" astonished many Westerners, some of whom even wondered if it marked a U-turn in the Chinese Communist Party's values, openly allowing wealth disparities. In fact, this policy won tremendous support from the Chinese public in its implementation. Deng Xiaoping once said that allowing some people and regions to get rich first would speed up economic growth and help achieve the ultimate goal of common prosperity. More importantly, the "rich helping the poor" has profound cultural and psychological foundations in Chinese society.
For example, in the old days in China, a poor rural family might have had several children. What were they supposed to do? The family would very likely pool all their resources to support the eldest son in attending school and finding work. Once the eldest son became self-reliant and prosperous, he could assist his younger siblings to grow up and find jobs.
The logic behind some family members becoming rich first and then helping those lagging behind also applies to the nation, because Chinese society views family and state as structurally similar. Even today, phrases like "being master of the house" are used to signify being the master of the country.
Cultural soil for common prosperity
The parallels between family and state can be further extended to the whole world. While class differences is inevitable in a community constructed on the basis of Chinese historical and cultural logic, its foundational value is "inclusion." Be it a family, a state, or the whole world, it is a community that has only internal members and no outsiders. The internal class differences in such a community does not lead to disruptive gaps nor produce perpetual segregation between classes and groups.
The generative logic of such a community goes from family to state to world, while its values logic is in the reverse order. Although a state is, in a sense, an extension of the family, to understand families correctly, they need to be judged at the level of the state using the yardstick of the state. Similarly, the world is an extension of states; to understand them correctly, they need to be judged at the level of the world using the yardstick of the world. Individuals find meaning in their existence by blending harmoniously with the family, the state, and the world.
Therefore, the cultural perspectives grounded upon family, state, and world naturally become the cultural soil to carry patterns of behavior like collectivism, public ownership, and common prosperity. In other words, Chinese culture is more suited than Western culture for the growth and development of socialism at the level of historical and cultural consciousness and even the level of sub-consciousness. As for the appropriateness of history and culture to social forms, Chinese culture aligns better with the scientific socialism of Marxism.
Culture is a fundamental, deep, and enduring force, and such historical and cultural perspectives "have already become part of the Chinese nation's DNA." Common prosperity was insisted upon not only by the Chinese Communists who carried out the socialist revolution but also by Sun Yat-sen, who led the bourgeois revolution in early 20th-century China. He said, "The most important thing for the principle of the people's welfare is reducing inequality between rich and poor."
Common prosperity has deep historical and cultural resonance in Chinese society and also conforms to the objective laws of social communities. However, for thousands of years, it has remained a social ideal, the root cause of which is the mismatch between social systems and social forms. The social systems and forms that can truly support common prosperity have yet to emerge. When necessary socioeconomic conditions are in place, that is to say，after the founding of the People's Republic of China, an ideal society marked by common prosperity takes root and flourishes in Chinese society.
The views don't necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.
The author is Xin Ming, professor at the School of Marxism, Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C (National Academy of Governance).
Editor/ Liu Xian
Translator/ Zhang Rong
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